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ABSTRACT
In  this  paper,  we  present  a  goal-directed  proof  procedure  for  abductive  reasoning.  This 
procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin 
with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show 
that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed 
proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, 
we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s 
algorithms.
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1. Introduction
Very few philosophers of science will object to the idea that abduction plays a key role in 
scientific reasoning. Still, the logical foundations of abduction have been seriously neglected, 
both  by  logicians  and  philosophers  of  science.  For  centuries,  the  former  have  discarded 
abduction as a fallacy (“affirming the consequent”), about which nothing ‘decent’ can be said. 
The latter are usually more sympathetic to the concept, despite (or, as is sometimes the case, 
thanks to) the fact that also they believe there is nothing logical about it.
There is, however, a gradual change in attitude. Two developments seem important for 
this. On the one hand, the advent of non-standard logics (especially non-monotonic ones) 
made it possible to broaden the domain of logic to include all kinds of reasoning forms that 
are traditionally viewed as non-logical. On the other hand, abduction has been intensively 
studied within computer science and Artificial Intelligence, which led to a large variety of 
logic-based approaches to abduction.
Important as these developments are, the results are fragmented and their application 
to problems of philosophy of science are often far from evident. Aliseda (2006) is a welcome 
exception to this. In this book, Aliseda presents a general framework for the logical study of 
abduction, that has roots in formal logic as well as computer science, and shows how it can be 
applied to problems in the philosophy of science (such as explanation, empirical progress and 
epistemic  change).  We mention  only  a  few examples  of  what  we  consider  to  be  central 
contributions: the taxonomy for abduction (which is the most elaborated one available in the 
literature) and the analysis of the different “abductive styles”, the attention for “abductive 
anomaly”  (which  is  too  often  ignored),  and  the  structural  characterization  of  abductive 
inference.  In view of this,  we are convinced that the book will  soon count  as a standard 
reference for the study of abduction.
1 Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from the Research Foundation – 
Flanders (FWO - Vlaanderen). The authors are indebted to Christian Straßer for checking some prolog code.
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The reader will forgive us for adding a personal note. For about ten years now, the first 
author  has  been  convinced  that  abduction  should  be  modelled  as  a  kind  of  “forward 
reasoning”, in which one tries to derive the explanations  from the theory together with the 
explanandum.2 This resulted in a number of papers on formal logics for abduction that lead 
from a theory and one or more explananda to a set of possible explanations (see, for instance, 
Meheus and Batens (2006)). It is under the influence of Aliseda’s book that Meheus began to 
see a number of limitations to this particular approach and that she started to look elsewhere.3 
This eventually led to a cooperation with the second author,  who, for applications totally 
unrelated to  abduction,  had been working on a  specific  type of  goal-directed proofs  (see 
Batens and Provijn (2001)).
The  goal-directed  proofs  from  Batens  and  Provijn  (2001)  bear  similarities  with 
semantic tableaux (which are at the heart of Aliseda’s computational approach to abduction). 
For instance, unlike ordinary proofs, these goal-directed proofs form a decision method for 
A1, …, An Ú B. Moreover, they are primarily based on the analysis of formulas. One of the 
differences is that, for most sets of premises, goal-directed proofs are more efficient (require 
less computation) than semantic tableaux.
As it turns out, abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of goal-directed proofs. 
Moreover,  they  seem  a  nice  compromise  between  forward  and  backward  approaches: 
although the explanandum is not included among the premises, it is the starting point of the 
derivation, and moreover directs the inferences that are made.
In  this  paper,  we  shall  present  the  basic  ideas  behind  goal-directed  proofs  for 
abduction and make some comparisons with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. 
We will  necessarily have to be brief,  but we refer  the reader to Meheus and Provijn (To 
Appear) for a more detailed discussion. 
We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s approach, acknowledging at once that, in 
this very short contribution, we shall not be able to do justice to it.
2. Abduction Through Semantic Tableaux
In this section, we shall argue that Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions 
by means of tableaux (Aliseda, 2006, pp. 113-116) do not entirely live up to their aims: the 
procedures do not warrant that the generated explanations are non-redundant (in the sense of 
the definition on p. 111) and that the one for consistent conjunctive abductions moreover does 
not warrant consistency.
We begin with the algorithm for conjunctive plain abductions (Aliseda, 2006, p. 113). 
It is claimed in footnote 3 that the algorithm does not lead to redundant solutions, because 
each conjunctive explanation is a conjunction of partial explanations. However, in instruction 
3 of the algorithm, conjunctions are constructed that contain one literal from each BPC(Γi);4 
in the next and final instruction only  repeated conjuncts are eliminated. Hence, there is no 
2 Abduction is usually viewed as a kind of “backward reasoning”: “given an explanandum B and a theory T, find an 
explanation A such that B can be derived from T and A”.
3 One limitation is that the logics seem suitable only one of Aliseda’s abductive styles, namely the one where one is 
interested in the minimal abductions.
4 BPC(Γi) – the Branch Partial Closure of Γi – is the set of literals that close the open branch Γi but do not close all 
the other open branches of the tableau.
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warrant that the conjunctions do not contain conjuncts that, in view of the other conjuncts, are 
superfluous to close the tableau.5 Here is an example.6
Example 1.  Θ = {((p & q) & r) Ä s, ((p & q) Å t) Ä s} ϕ = s. 
The only non-redundant conjunctive explanation is p & q, but also (p & q) & r is generated.
One way to remedy this first problem is to add an instruction that eliminates all non-minimal 
conjunctions – we call an abductive solution ⋀(Σ) minimal iff there is no Σ'  ⊂ Σ for which 
⋀(Σ') is also an abductive solution.
The procedure for conjunctive consistent explanations (p. 115) is plagued by the same 
problem.  Actually,  the  problem is  even  worse,  because  now  all possible  conjunctions  of 
partial explanations are generated as abductive solutions. Moreover, although it is claimed 
that the “production of any inconsistency whatsoever” is avoided (Aliseda, 2006, pp. 114), the 
procedure does not warrant this. Here are but two examples – note that in each case the theory 
is consistent and the explanandum is compatible with it.
Example 2. Θ = {p Ä q, r Å s} ϕ = q.
The procedure leads to Ãr & ~s as a consistent explanation for q, which is incompatible with 
r Å s.
Example 3. Θ = {p Ä q, (r & ~r) Ä q} ϕ = q.
In view of the  tautology (r & ~r)  Ä q, the  contradiction r & ~r is obtained as a consistent 
explanation for q.
The cause for this second problem is simple: even if the literals are compatible with the theory 
(which is checked in instruction 3), their conjunctions need not be. Hence, what is needed is 
an additional instruction in which those ρi from instruction 6 are selected for which T (Θ + ρi) 
is a semi-closed extension.
These  additional  instructions  are  needed  also  for  another  reason.  On  p.  116  it  is 
claimed  that,  in  order  to  modify  the  algorithms to  handle  the  production  of  explanatory 
abductions, one only needs to avoid self-explanations (the case where the abductive solution 
Õ is identical to the explanandum ϕ). Aliseda justifies this claim by her Fact 4 – the idea that, 
given any Θ and ϕ, the algorithms never produce abductive solutions Õ such that Õ Û ϕ. As in 
some cases abductive solutions will be generated that are internally inconsistent (see example 
3), this Fact does not hold in general.7 It also does not hold true in general (as Atocha claims 
on p. 114) that the trivial solution (where Õ = ϕ) can be avoided by first running the algorithm 
for atomic explanations. The reason is that the algorithms for atomic explanations do not 
always rule out self-explanations. For instance, where Θ = {s Ä p, p Ä s}, p is generated as an 
explanation for p. The following is a bit less obvious:8
5 According to Aliseda (personal communication), we are mistaken in not taking into account that what can be 
found on p. 113 of Aliseda (2006) is only a sketch of the algorithm as it is presented in Aliseda (1997) (see also the 
claims on p. 110 of Aliseda (2006)). On her view, the redundancy problem does not occur because after the last 
instruction of the algorithm, the generated solutions have to be checked against the conditions listed in the output 
of the algorithm.
6 We follow Aliseda's convention to use Θ as metavariable for background theories and ϕ as a metavariable for 
explananda.
7 Given the generality of Aliseda’s Fact 4, it cannot be held against us that we chose an example in which one of 
the premises is a tautology.
8 On Aliseda’s procedures, any theory from which the explanandum is not derivable can be transformed into one 
that leads to atomic self-explanations: where ϕ is the explanandum, it suffices to add ϕ Å ~ϕ to the theory.
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Example 4. Θ = {s Ä p, (p & (q Å r)) Ä s} ϕ = p. 
Not only s is produced as an explanation for p, but also p.
We  end  this  section  with  a  remark  on  the  notion  of  “partial  explanation”.  On  Aliseda’s 
account, given a theory Θ and explanandum ϕ, a formula Ö counts as a partial explanation for 
ϕ iff T ((Θ + ~ϕ) + Ö) is semi-closed. This definition is one of the main reasons why, in the 
abductive solutions, irrelevant conjuncts may creep in: the definition does not warrant that 
there is any relation between the ‘partial explanation’ and the explanandum. One may respond 
to  this  that  the  problem disappears  if  only  relevant premises  are  included  in  the  theory. 
However, this is setting the cart before the horse. One of the main problems in searching for 
an abduction is precisely to identify the relevant premises. And, in all interesting cases, this 
problem is only solved when the abductive explanations have been generated.
In Section 4, we shall see that this problem is dealt with in a very natural way by goal-
directed  proofs.  But  first  we  present  a  very  brief  introduction  to  the  format,  which  was 
elaborated in Batens and Provijn (2001). 
3. Goal-Directed Proofs
The basic idea is that the formal elements of the search process, involved in the construction 
of a proof for Γ  Ú G, are pushed in the proof itself. In this section, Γ always denotes the 
premise set and G is used to refer to the main goal of the search process. In a goal-directed 
proof, formulas are derived that have the following form
[B1, …, Bn] A
which indicates that  A is derived on the condition [B1, …,  Bn].9 The rules of the inference 
system are such that: ‘if [∆]A is derivable from a set of premises Γ then Γ ∪ ∆Ú A.’
A goal-directed proof starts with the introduction of the main goal by writing
[G] G
on the first line of the proof. This line is logically redundant but, as we shall see, guides the 
search procedure. The condition of [∆]A reminds us that these formulas have not yet been 
derived and that they should be derived in order to derive A.
If G is a positive part of a premise A, it is allowed that A is entered in the proof and, if 
G is different from A, that A is analyzed. If G is not positive part of a premise, the condition 
of [G]G is analyzed in such a way that a set of new goals is obtained that will guide the search 
process.
Inference  systems  satisfying  this  proof  format  allow  for  perspicuous  and  simple 
heuristics that warrant goal-directed and efficient proofs. However, in this introduction, we 
have to omit the discussion of the heuristics – we refer the reader to Batens and Provijn 
(2001) and to Meheus and Provijn (To Appear) for this.
The goal-directed proof procedure also needs marking definitions. Lines in a proof are 
marked if some goal in the condition of that line is useless in order to derive the main goal or 
a derived goal. 
For  a  concise  formulation of  the  positive part relation and the  inference rules  we 
distinguish between  a-  and  b-formulas,  based on a  theme from Smullyan (1995).  Let  ∗A 
denote the ‘complement’ of A, viz. B if A has the form ~B and ~A otherwise.
9 If the condition is empty (notation: [Ø]A or simply A), A is said to be derived unconditionally.
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a a1 a2 b b1 b2
A & B A B ~(A & B) ∗A ∗B
A ≡ B A Ä B B Ä A ~(A ≡ B) ~(A Ä B) ~(B Ä A)
~(A Å B) ∗A ∗B A Å B A B
~(A Ä B) A ∗B A Ä B ∗A B
~~A A A
The following clauses constitute a recursive definition of the positive part relation for 
propositional classical logic (henceforth CL):
1. pp(A, A).
2. pp(A, a) if pp(A, a1) or pp(A, a2).
3. pp(A, b) if pp(A, b1) or pp(A, b2).
4. pp(A, B) and pp(B, C), then pp(A, C).
We now move to the instructions for CL.10 Two general restrictions have to be taken 
into account:
R1 Formula analyzing rules are not applied on formulas introduced by the Goal rule.
R2 No rule is applied to repeat a marked or unmarked line.
The instruction Goal introduces the main goal in the proof:
Goal Start a goal-directed proof with:
1  [G] G Goal 
Premises are only introduced in the proof if a goal of an unmarked line is a positive 
part of it:
Prem If A is a goal of an unmarked line, B ∈ Γ and pp(A, B), then one may add:
k B Prem 
If a goal A is a positive part of a formula B that was introduced by Prem, the formula 
analyzing rules  allow one to analyze  B until  [∆]A is  derived on a line in  the proof.  The 
formula analyzing rules can be summarized as follows:11
[∆] a [∆] b
 [∆] a1 [∆] a2  [∆∪{∗ b2}] b1 [∆∪{∗ b1}] b2
The  general  form  of  the  rules  is  [∆]A  /  [∆∪∆']B.  Their  application  is  governed  by  the 
following instruction (in which R refers to the name of the analyzing rule):
10 For reasons of space, we present a version in which the instructions are immediately linked to the inference rules 
– see Batens (2003). This version is less deterministic than the one presented in Batens and Provijn (2001).
11 If two formulas occur at the bottom line of a rule, both variants may be derived (separately) in the proof.
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FAR If C is a goal of an unmarked line, [∆]A is the formula of an unmarked line i, [∆]A / [∆
∪∆']B is a formula analyzing rule, and pp(C, B), then one may add:
k [∆∪∆'] B i R
The names of the formula analyzing rules are †E, with † ∈ {&, Å, Ä, ~, ≡} or ~‡E with ‡ ∈ 
{&, Å, Ä, ≡}.
If  no  goal  is  a  positive  part  of  a  premise  or  an  analyzed  formula,  the  condition 
analyzing rules lead to the analysis of the available goals. These rules can be summarized as:
 [∆∪{a}] A [∆∪{b}] A
[∆∪{a1 , a2}] A [∆∪{ b1}] A [∆∪{ b2}] A
The general form of the rules is [∆∪{B}]A / [∆∪∆']A . Their application is governed by:
CAR If A is a goal of an unmarked line, [∆∪{B}]A is the formula of an unmarked line i, [∆
∪{B}]A / [∆∪∆']A is a condition analyzing rule, then one may add:
k [∆∪∆'] A i R
The names of the condition analyzing rules are equal to the names of the formula analyzing 
rules preceded by a C.
As A Å ~A is valid in CL, Excluded Middle allows for the elimination of certain goals 
by the following instruction:
EM If  A is a goal of an unmarked line, [∆∪{B}]A and [∆'  ∪{~B}]A are the respective 
formulas of the unmarked lines i and j, and ∆⊆∆' or ∆'⊆∆, then one may add:
k [∆∪∆'] A i, j EM
The instruction  Transitivity allows both for the elimination of goals that are derived 
unconditionally  and for  the  generation  of  alternative  conditions  (if  the  goals  of  a  certain 
condition are themselves conditionally derived in the proof):
Trans If  A is  a  goal  of  an  unmarked  line,  and  [∆∪{B}]A and  [∆']B are  the  respective 
formulas of the unmarked lines i and j, then one may add:
 k [∆∪∆'] A i, j TRANS
As we are concerned here with the goal-directed generation of abductive explanations from 
consistent and  finite premise  sets,  both  the  instruction  for  the  application  of  Ex  Falso 
Quodlibet (EFQ)12 and the restrictions for infinite premise sets can be skipped (see Batens and 
Provijn (2001)).
The  last  elements  of  the  procedure  are  the  marking  definitions.  For  the  current 
application, there are three reasons for marking a line: redundancy, inconsistency and loops. 
12 The instruction EFQ is completely isolated. Without it, a paraconsistent variant of the CL procedure is obtained 
– see Batens (To Appear).
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A line on which [∆∪∆']A has been derived is redundant and hence R-marked if [∆]A 
has been derived in the proof. Evidently, searching for the members of ∆' is useless to obtain 
A.
Definition 1 Line i on which [∆]A is derived, is R-marked on a stage of a proof if on that 
stage [∆']A is derived and ∆'⊂ ∆.
A condition contains a flat inconsistency if both A and ~A occur in it. If the derivation 
of G relies on the derivation of an inconsistency, the procedure of Batens and Provijn (2001) 
takes care of this by means of EFQ. As abductive explanations should not be generated by 
means  of  inconsistencies,  lines  of  which  the  condition  contains  a  flat  inconsistency  are 
I-marked.
Definition 2 Line i on which [∆]A is derived, is I-marked if ∆ is flatly inconsistent.
Lines on which [∆∪{A}]A is derived can only lead to loops in the search process and 
are  L-marked.  This  also  indicates  that  the  search  process  for  A should  be  led  by  other 
conditions, if possible.
Definition 3 Line  i on which [∆]A is  derived,  is  L-marked if  A ∈ ∆,  unless  line  i was 
introduced by means of the Goal rule.
A proof is finished whenever G is derived. A proof is stopped if it is finished or if no 
further instructions can be applied.
4. Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs
Recognizing  abductive  solutions  on  the  basis  of  goal-directed  proofs  is  absolutely 
straightforward. Here are the definitions:
Definition 4 Given a theory Θ and an explanandum ϕ, A is an atomic explanation for ϕ iff 
A is a literal and [A]ϕ is derived on an unmarked line (different from the goal line) in a proof 
for ΘÚ ϕ that is stopped but not finished.
Definition 5 Given  a  theory  Θ and  an  explanandum  ϕ,  A1&…&An is  a  conjunctive 
explanation for ϕ iff A1, …, An are literals and [A1, …, An]ϕ (n > 1) is derived on an unmarked 
line in a proof for ΘÚ ϕ that is stopped but not finished.
As is shown in Meheus and Provijn (To Appear), the requirement that the proof should be 
stopped but not finished warrants, together with the marking rules, that all abductive solutions 
that satisfy these definitions are explanatory (in the sense of (Aliseda, 2006, p. 74). That the 
proof should be stopped moreover warrants that all possible abductive solutions occur in the 
proof.
In the above definitions, we assume, like Aliseda, that  ϕ is a literal. However, as is 
shown in Meheus and Provijn (To Appear), the approach can easily be generalized to handle 
other forms of explananda.
We shall now review the examples from Section 2 in terms of goal-directed proofs. All 
proofs are generated according to the heuristics discussed in Meheus and Provijn (To Appear).
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The first example illustrates how goal-directed proofs warrant the non-redundancy of 
the abductive explanations.
Example 1. Θ = {((p & q) & r) Ä s, ((p & q) Å t) Ä s} ϕ = s.
1 [s] s Goal 
2 ((p & q) & r) Ä s Prem 
3 [(p & q) & r] s 2 ÄE 
4 [p & q, r] s 3 C&E 
5 [p, q, r] s 4 C&E R
6 ((p & q) Å t) Ä s Prem 
7 [(p & q) Å t] s 6 ÄE 
8 [p & q] s 7 CÅE 
9 [t] s 7 CÅE 
10 [p, q] s 8 C&E 
At stage 10 of the proof, line 5 is R-marked and the proof is stopped. Hence, (p & q) & r is 
not retained as an explanation for s.
On Aliseda's method, the next two examples lead to inconsistent explanations. In the 
goal-directed proofs,  the inconsistent explanations are either not generated or the lines on 
which they occur are I-marked.
Example 2. Θ = {p Ä q, r Å s} ϕ = q.
As both q and p are not a positive part of r Å s, the latter is never entered in the proof. Hence, 
[~r, ~s] q cannot be derived.
Example 3. Θ = {p Ä q, (r & ~r) Ä q} ϕ = q.
1 [q] q Goal 
2 p Ä q Prem 
3 [p] q 2 ÄE 
4 (r & ~r) Ä q Prem 
5 [r & ~r] q 4 ÄE
6 [r, ~r] q 5 C&E I
As soon as line 6 is entered, it is I-marked. Hence, in the stopped proof, only p is retained as 
an explanation for q.
The final example illustrates how self-explanations are ruled out.
Example 4. Θ = {s Ä p, (p & (q Å r)) Ä s} ϕ = p.
1 [p] Goal 
2 s Ä p Prem 
3 [s] p 2 ÄE
4 (p & (q Å r)) Ä s Prem 
5 [p & (q Å r)] s 4 ÄE 
6 [p, q Å r] s 5 C&E 
7 [p, q Å r] p 3,6 Trans L
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Some more lines may be added to this proof (depending on the heuristics followed).  For 
instance, CÅE can be applied to line 6, and Trans to the resulting line and line 3. However, all 
these lines will be L-marked. Hence, the only explanation for p that is generated is s.
5. Comparing the Two Methods
Like tableaux, the goal-directed proofs presented here are essentially based on Õ- and Ö-type 
transformation rules. Still, as we discuss in more length in Meheus and Provijn (To Appear), 
generating  abductions  on  the  basis  of  goal-directed  proofs  seem  to  have  a  number  of 
advantages. First, the procedure is (in general) more efficient. One of the reasons for this is 
that  only  relevant premises  are  introduced in  the  proof.13 Next,  problems  of  redundancy, 
irrelevance, inconsistency and (partial or total) self-explanations can be dealt with in a very 
efficient and transparent way. Finally, the format can easily be generalized to handle other 
kinds of abductive inference, such as the case in which the explanandum is not a literal, the 
case in which the explanandum is inconsistent with the theory (“abductive anomalies”), and 
the case in which the theory itself is inconsistent.14
A possible disadvantage of the goal-directed proofs is that we see no elegant way to 
handle Aliseda’s disjunctive explanations (although we should add that we are not entirely 
convinced of the unrestricted way in which disjunctive abductions are generated in Aliseda’s 
tableaux either).  Another  advantage of  tableaux is  their  graphical  format  (but  see  Batens 
(2006) for a diagrammatic representation of goal-directed proofs).
There is a more philosophical reason why we think the comparison between the two 
methods is useful. Most of the problems that we discussed in Section 2 could be considered as 
cases in which something is ‘wrong’ with the background theory (it contains tautologies, or 
irrelevant premises, or redundant premises, etc.). And, as Aliseda observes on p. 117, one’s 
algorithm is not necessarily to be blamed for this: “Bad theories produce bad explanations”. 
Unfortunately, in this messy and complex world, with our limited cognitive capacities and 
limited resources, we often have to work with ‘bad theories’. The more a method safeguards 
us from deriving bad explanations from such theories the better, so it seems. At least, if the 
cost for doing so is not too high.
This is the real discussion that we hope our comparison will contribute to.
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